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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XV

FEBRUARY, 1930

NUMBER 2

CASE LAW IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA*
ARTHUR L. GOODHARTt

It has become almost traditional for lawyers who deal with the
subject of Anglo-American relations to emphasize the fact that one
of the fundamental bonds between England and the United States
is the common law. It is my purpose to suggest that this bond is a
weakening one, and that even at the present time there is a marked
divergence between the English and the American attitude to the
most characteristic doctrine of the common law-the doctrine of
stare decisis.
In his lectures on The Theory of Judicial Decision,' Dean Pound
emphasized the fact that one of the three fundamental elements
of what we call law is :2
[A] body of traditional ideas as to how legal precepts should
be interpreted and applied and causes decided, and a traditional
technique of developing and applying legal precepts whereby
these precepts are eked out, extended, restricted, and adapted
to the exigencies of administration of justice.
He then gave the following example of this element :
In our legal system we have a good example in the doctrine
as to the force of judicial decisions as affecting judicial decision
of subsequent cases. It is almost impossible for the commonlaw lawyer and the civilian to understand each other in this
connection.
I believe that at the present time it is almost as difficult for the
English lawyer to understand the American theory of precedent
as it is for him to understand the civilian, and that in place of two
conflicting systems-the common law and the civilianf-we are
now faced with three different methods, the English, the American,
and the civilian. The American system at present lies closer to
the English than it does to the civilian, but the tendency seems to
*An address delivered April 27, 1929, on the Frank Irvine Lectureship, established by the Conkling Inn of Phi Delta Phi.
fEditor of THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW; Fellow of Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge, Eng.; Visiting Professor at the Yale University
Law School, 1928-29.
2
1(1923) 36 HAxv. L. Rev. 641.
2Ibid. 645.
3 id. 646.
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be for it to shift towards the latter. To make this clear it is necessary
to consider briefly what the three systems are.
The civilian system, as exemplified by the French practice, has
been well stated by Professor Lambert of the University of Lyons
in an article shortly to be published in the Yale Law Journal:4
In France, the judicial precedent does not, ipso facto, bind
either the tribunals which established it nor the lower courts;
and the Court of Cassation itself retains the right to go back on its
own decisions. The courts of appeal may oppose a doctrine
proclaimed by the Court of Cassation, and this opposition has
sometimes led to a change of opinion on the part of the higher
court. The practice of the courts does not become a source of
the law until it is definitely fixed by the repetition of precedents
which are in agreement on a single point.
Decided cases, therefore, only affect the law in so far as they
create a practice or body of doctrine.5 An individual case, even if
decided by the highest court, has only a limited persuasive authority,
unless the situation is exceptional. Moreover, it is only in a severely
restricted number of situations that these de facto precedents are
applied. As Judge Henry of the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt has said:6
The codes are supposed to contain the whole of the law, and
such theory is by no means so far from truth as a Common Law
legist might suppose. In actual practice certainly 99 per cent of
the cases coming before the courts are disposed of by the broad
general principles to be found in the codes.
7
A number of distinguished writers, including Professor Holland
of Oxford and Dean Pound, 8 have suggested that the distinction
4
Now published: Lambert and Wasserman, The Case Method in Canadaand the
Possibilitiesof its Adaptation to the Civil Law (1929) 39 YALE L. J. i, 14.
5
Cf. the article, Casa Law and the European Codified Law (1925) 19 ILL. L.
Rxv. 505, by Hans Sperl, dean of the faculty and professor of law at the University
of Vienna, in which he says at 59: "In the sense thus explained judicial decisions
are esteemed in the countries, of continental Europe. Not as the finding-place
(Fundort) of the positive law; not as a source, recognized by the state constitution, from which new law may flow; but only as instructive for a sound understanding and just application of the statutes. These are purposes sufficiently
high and important to explain why men collect and study the courts' decisions
and utilize them as significant guide-posts in the application of a code.
"Continental countries and jurists will never bring themselves to abandon the
exclusive authority of statutory law, and concede to a judicial decision the force
of a legal rule binding in similar cases thereafter arising."
6
Henry, JurisprudenceConstante and Stare Decisis (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. II, 12.
7

HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE

(I3th ed. 1924) 70: "There have been of late some

symptoms of an approximation between the two theories."
8
0p. cit. supra note I, at 646: "In fact our practice and the practice of the
Roman-law world are not so far apart as legal theory makes them seem to be."

CASE LAW IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
between the civilian and the common law systems is more marked
in theory than in practice. It is interesting on this point to cite
the experience of Judge Henry:'
But from my own experience in the actual application of the
Civil Law, including of course my observation of the work of
counsel before the court, I have come to realize that such indicia
may be misleading. It is clear that the divergence in attitude
as to precedents between the Civil Law and the Common is still
great, and that there is little likelihood of its becoming substantially less for a long time to come.
It is, of course, true that a system which recognizes the persuasive
effect of established practice will tend under certain circumstances
to resemble a system based on the binding effect of individual precedents, but the machinery and technique of reaching this similar
result are fundamentally different. It is only necessary to compare
the small working library of a French lawyer with the number of
reports required by an English barrister to realize that here are two
different systems. Compare, also, such works as Williston on Contracts and Wigmore on Evidence with their thousands of citations
and continual analytical references to individual cases, with such
standard French works as Planiol, Droit Civil, Colin et Capitant,
Droit Civil, B6darride, Droit Commercial, in which individual cases
are never discussed and only cited in rare instances. It is hardly
surprising to find that the civilian refers to the English system of
case law as "la superstitiondu cas".10
The English doctrine of precedent has been well stated by Sir
John Salmond:"
A judicial precedent speaks in England with authority;
it is not merely evidence of the law but a source of it; and the
courts are bound to follow the law that is so established....
Absolute authority exists in the following cases:
(i) Every court is absolutely bound by the decisions of all
courts superior to itself. A court of first instance cannot question a decision of the Court of Appeal, nor can the Court of Appeal refuse to follow the judgments of the House of Lords. (2) The House of Lords is absolutely bound by its own decision...
(3) The Court of Appeal is, it would seem, absolutely bound
by its own decisions and by those of older courts of co-ordinate
authority, for example, the Court of Exchequer Chamber.
This unqualified statement of the binding nature of a precedent
has, as far as I know, not been questioned by a single English author9
0p. cit. supranote 6, at ii.
lOCf. Kotze, JudicialPrecedent

(1918) I44 LAW TIMES 349.

"HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed.) 187.
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ity. Sir Frederick Pollock" and Professor Holland 3 accept this view,
and Mr. Allen in his recent book, Law in the Making,14 although he
considers this is a strictly nineteenth century doctrine, does not
dissent from it.
The only doubtful voice is that of Professor W. Jethro Brown of
Australia, who acknowledges that precedents bind, but fears that
the doctrine of stare decisis is being whittled away by ingenuity in
making distinctions:"Of course precedents bind! But there appears to me a more
evident desire and/or ingenuity in distinguishing a precedent
from the complexus of facts before the Court if the application
of precedent might lead to inconvenient consequence.
Unfortunately Professor Brown does not give any references
to prove these ingenious distinctions. Whether a distinction is
ingenious or not is after all a matter of personal judgment, and a
statement, unsupported by citations, is only of doubtful value,
however distinguished the writer may be. In this connection it is
interesting to note that Lord Justice Scrutton 16 and Mr. Stallybrass, 17 the editor of Salmond on Torts, differ in their views as to the
(5th ed. 1923) 346. 13Op. cit. supra note 7, at 68.
14Mr. Allen says at 19I: "In the eighteenth century, precedents play a large
part in the practice of the law, but the Judges do not consider themselves in any
way bound by decisions of which they do not approve." With all respect, we feel
that this language goes too far. He cites Chief Justice Vaughan's dictum that
yet "if a Court give judgment judicially, another Court is not bound to give like
judgment, unless it think that judgment first given was according to law." Concerning this dictum Sir Frederick Pollock, op. cit. supranote 12, at 325, remarks:
"If Vaughan, C. J., really said that a judge can never be bound to follow an
authority with which he personally does not agree, he disregarded the uniform
practice of English courts." Mr. Allen also cites Lord Mansfield's dictum in
Jones v. Randall, I Cowp. 37 (1774) as giving "the characteristic view", but
Lord Mansfield was hardly a typical common law judge. It is certainly true
that the eighteenth century doctrine was not as inflexible as is that of the present
day-due perhaps to the fact that there was not a single High Court of Judicature
and also to the fact that some of the reports were unsatisfactory-but the uniformity of the decisions in that century, with certain rare exceptions, seems to
conflict with Mr. Allen's view.
15Brown, Administration of Justice in England x9o6 v. 1923 (1924) 33 YALE
L. J. 838.
6
1 1n re Polemis, [1921] 3 K. B. 56o, 577: "Perhaps the House of Lords will
some day explain why, if a cheque is negligently filled up, it is a direct effect of the
negligence that some one finding the cheque should commit forgery... ; while
if some one negligently leaves a libellous letter about, it is not a direct effect of the
negligence that the finder should show the letter to the person libelled."
17SALMOND, ToRTs (Stallybrass's 7th ed. 1928) 175: "The explanation seems to
be that a man may well contract not negligently or indeed at all to provide the
occasion for another's wrongdoing, but that independently of contract or intention he will not be held liable for it."
12POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE
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reasonableness of the distinction drawn by the House of Lords between the facts in Weld-Blundell v. Stephens' s and those in London
Joint Stock Bank v. MacMillan."
How strictly the English courts construe the doctrine of stare
decisis is shown by the recent case of Great Western Ry. v. Owners
of S. S. Mostyn,20 in which the House of Lords had to consider the
doubtful and inconvenient case of Wear v. Adamson.21 Almost fifty
pages are occupied in a close analysis of what the latter case held,
although, as Viscount Haldane pointed out, 22 if it had not been for

the Wear case, it would have been possible to take a simple view of
the matter. In 192X in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Blottn Lord
Sumner delivered a strong dissent, but in 1926 in Inland Revenue
Commissioners v. Fisher'sEx'rsl he insisted upon the binding authority of the Blott case and pointed out that it could not be distinguished.2
Perhaps the most strildng illustration of the binding nature of
precedents under the English system is to be found in Volume I
26
of the 1926 King's Bench reports, for in six cases there reported,
one or more of the judges state that they might have decided the
case before them differently if they had not been bound by a prior
decided case. Only two examples need be given. In Daley v. Lees,
27
Lord Hewart, C. J., says:
One has to approach the matter on the pure question of law
whether Parker v. Talbot applies and governs this case...
I am compelled to take a course and expound a view which, if
the matter were open, I should not take or expound.
18[192O] A. C. 956, 985.
1[I918] A. C. 777.
20[1928] A. C. 57.
212 App. Cas. 743 (1877).
'2 Supra note 20, at 63: "But we cannot proceed here on this simple view. It
has been established by a decision which is binding on us by this House that the
language must be interpreted as subject to some qualification which is implicit
in the words, and the question which alone we are free and bound to examine, is
what this qualification is, and how far it extends."
2'[1921] 2 A. C. 171.
24[1926] A. C. 395.
"fbid. 407: "My Lords, the authority of Blott's case constrains your Lordships to dismiss this appeal, but, as I regret the necessity for this conclusion,
perhaps I may venture to state how it is that, in my view, in spite of considerable
differences of fact between the two cases, the result must, nevertheless, be the
same."
26Daley v. Lees, [1926] i K. B. 40, 46; Huyton and Roby Gas Co. v. Liverpool
Corp., [1926] I K. B. 146, 152; Freeborn v. Leeming, [1926] I K. B. I6o, 171,
172; Chaplin v. Smith, [1926] I K. B. I98, 205; Williams v. Guest, Keen and
Nettlefolds, [1926] I K. B. 497, 504; Pontypridd Union Guardians v. Drew,
[1926] I K. B. 567, 575, 576.
27Supra note 26, at 46.
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In Williams v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, Lord Justice Atldn said :28
I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, and I do so solely
because I consider that this Court is bound by the decision in
Steel v. Cammell, Laird and Co., which it is impossible to distinguish from the facts of this particular case.
It is important to note that no one of the cases referred to above
was concerned with property or with contract rights. The English
doctrine of stare decisis is not based upon the narrow theory that
precedents should be binding only in those cases in which a departure
from a prior decision would injure a person who had relied on it.
It is founded on the broader theory that it is, essential for the law
to be certain, and that to attain this certainty it is worth while
to sacrifice justice in occasional cases. This has been stated in its
most positive form by the Earl of Halsbury: 2
Of course I do not deny that cases of individual hardship
may arise, and there may be.a current of opinion in the profession
that such and such a judgment was erroneous; but what is that
occasional interference with what is perhaps abstract justice
as compared with the inconvehience-the disastrous inconvenience--of having each question subject to being reargued and the
dealings of mankind rendered doubtful by reason of different
decisions, so that in truth and in fact there would be no real
final Court of Appeal? My Lords, "interest rei publicae"
that there should be "finis litium" at some time, and there could
be no "finis litium" if it were possible to suggest in each case
that it might be reargued, because it is "not an ordinary case,"
whatever that may mean.
The doctrine applies, therefore, in all cases equally. It is as desirable
to determine definitely the law of crimes and of torts as it is to establish the law of property or of contracts, although the criminal
and the tortfeasor cannot reasonably be supposed to have relied
upon the law. It is on the ground that certainty in the law is essential that the English doctrine is based.
Is this doctrine one which will probably endure? Is there any
evidence that English lawyers and jurists are dissatisfied with it?
The negative evidence is overwhelming. A search through the English periodicals since 90oo does not show a single article or note
28Supra note 26, at 504.
29

London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A. C.
375, 380. As this case has been frequently criticized, it may be noted that it was
decided by a strong House which included Lord Macnaghten. In referring
to this case, the HARVARD LAW REVIEW in a comment, (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv.
74, said: "The admission of the House of Lords that it cannot reverse itselfon a
proposition of law is one of wealness." That is a failing of which Lord Halsbury
has never before been accused.
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by an English lawyer in which the system has been adversely criticized. No modem English poet has arisen to denounce the English
law as Tennyson did seventy years ago .2

Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances,
Through which a few, by wit or fortune led,
May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame.
Perhaps the reason why the English lawyer is not dissatisfied
with the present system is that the "myriad" precedents do not
exist. The English cases to 1865 are reprinted in the English Reports
in about 175 volumes. The semi-official Law Reports from 1865 to
the present date occupy about 450 volumes. Thus 625 volumes will
make a complete working library. Only a small proportion of the
decided cases are reported each year; unless a case deals with a novel
point of law-and novelty is strictly construed-it will rarely find
its way into the Reports.3 In 1927 the Law Reports of the House of
Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of
Appeal, the Chancery and King's Bench Divisions, the Divisional
Court dealing with appeals from the County Courts, and the Probate,
Divorce, and Admiralty Division, totalled less than four thousand
pages. In the same year the reported opinions of the New York courts
alone occupied seven thousand pages. It is hardly surprising to find
that the English lawyer has no difficulty in digesting the annual reports, and that he does not, therefore, demand a change in the established system.
What is the present American doctrine concerning the binding
nature of precedents? Is there any material evidence on which we
can venture to predict its probable course in the future? The answer
to the first question we will find primarily in the opinions of the courts;
the answer to the second we must seek in recent books and articles.
It is unnecessary to point out here that the United States Supreme
Court and the highest courts of the various states have never held
themselves to be absolutely bound by their own decisions. 2 In the
0Leolin, the unhappy lover in Aylmer's Field attempts to win his lady by

becoming a successful barrister.
3
For an authoritative statement of the English system of reporting see Sir
Frederick Pollock, editor of the Law Reports, Engisl Law Reporting (19o3) 19
L. Q. REv. 451.
32

1n Washington v. Dawson & Co, 264 U. S. 219, 238, 44 Sup. Ct. 302, 309

(1924) Mr. Justice Brandeis cites twelve instances in which the Supreme Court
has reversed itself.
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past, however, these reversals have been few in number and considered definitely exceptional. The strenuous efforts of the courts
to "distinguish" cases is evidence of this feeling that a precedent
must not be overruled. As Professor Hardman has written,33 "a few
sporadic departures from stare decisis do not create a tendency,"
and, on the whole, it may be said that the nineteenth century American doctrine approximated the English view.
But when we turn to the twentieth century we find a marked
difference in the attitude of the courts; a feeling of freedom exists
which would strike an English judge as revolutionary. It is only
necessary to quote a few examples from the many that could be given.
In Hertz v. Woodman34 Mr. Justice Lurton said:
The Circuit Court of Appeals was obviously not bound to
follow its, own prior decision. The rule of stare decisis, though
one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided.
In Rosen v. United States35 Mr. Justice Clarke uses striking language
to justify judicial legislation:
Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great
weight of judicial authority which have developed in support
of this modem rule, especially as applied to .the competency of
witnesses convicted of crime, proceed upon sound principle,
we conclude that the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1879
should no longer be applied to such cases as we have here, and
that the ruling of the lower courts on this first claim of error
should be approved.
In Adams Exp. Co. v. Beckwith,36 the Supreme Court of Ohio, in
overruling the doctrine laid down in Ellis v. Bitzer,37 which "it must
be conceded... has been the law of Ohio since 1825," said by Wanamaker, J.:
A decided case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and
righteousness, and no more. It is not enough to say "thus saith
the court." It must prove its right to control in any given situation by the degree in which it supports the rights of a party
violated and serves the cause of justice as to all parties concerned.
In Thurston v. Fritzs8 the Supreme Court of Kansas departed
from the common law rule concerning dying declarations:
33

Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. x63.

34218 U. S. 205, 212, 30
23245

Sup. Ct.

621, 622 (1910).

U. S. 467, 471, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 15o (1918).

36,OO Ohio St. 348, 351, 352, 126 N. E. 3oo, 3O
372 Ohio 89, 15 Am. Dec. 533 (1825).
3891 Kan. 468, 475, 138 Pac. 625, 627 (1914).

(1919).
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The doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude a departure
from precedent established by a series of decisions clearly
erroneous, unless property complications have resulted, and a
reversal would work a greater injury and injustice than would
ensue by following the rule.
The New York Court of Appeals in Oppenheimv. Kride39 expressed
the same doctrine in even stronger words, when Crane, J., said:
In fact, there has been no objection raised anywhere to the
right of the wife to maintain the action for criminal conversation except the plea that the ancient law did not give it to her.
Reverence for antiquity demands no such denial. Courts exist
for the purpose of ameliorating the harshness of ancient laws
inconsistent with modem progress when it can be done without
interfering with vested rights.
These examples, taken from cases decided by courts in widely separated states, show that the modem American doctrine of precedent is
far more liberal than the strict view of the English courts. Only where
a departure from earlier cases would interfere with vested rights do
we find a marked hesitation in repudiating established rules which
are thought to conflict with the mores of the present day.
When we turn to recent legal literature we find an even more
radical spirit than is shown by the courts. This is only to be expected for judges are, and ought to be, cautious in accepting novel
doctrines. The number of recent books and articles which deal with"
the theory of precedent is strong evidence that the American jurist
is attempting to create a new system which he believes will be more
in consonance with the social welfare than has been that of the past.
The views range all the way from the more moderate suggestion of
slight modification to the radical demand for the complete abolition
4
of stare decisis. 1
N. Y. I56, I65, I4O N. E. 227, 230 (1923).
OThe following quotations from recent articles, which are cited in alphabetical
order, will give some idea of the trend of American thought on this subject:
C. E. Blydenburgh, Stare Decisis (1918) 86 CENT. L. J. 388, 389: "The rule of
Stare Decisis is founded on public policy, but to give to this rule such adamant
power that no court would be permitted to depart therefrom, and to make it law
like that of the 'Medes and Persians, which altereth not,' is to emphasize the fact of
'judge-made laws' which has been so largely criticised in the press of late years."
Samuel B. Clarke, What May Be Done to Enable the Courts to Allay the Present
Discontent with the Administration of Justice (1916) 50 Am. L. Rav. 161, 163:
"The court must not deem itself bound by any precedent but may nevertheless
give due weight to precedents according to their just value as evidence of the law."
Arthur L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges (1914) YALE Rav. 234, 242: "The
legal profession is now on the defensive largely because of its having put overemphasis upon one of the sources of declared rules-the decisions in former
39236
0
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The moderate view can be found in the articles of Judge Cuthbert
cases-to the exclusion of other sources. Had the judges ever adhered strictly
to the doctrine that precedents are the only source of the common law and are of
binding effect, surely those precedents would have been overthrown in short
order and the judges along with them. But precedents have been forgotten,'
have been disregarded and evaded, have been flatly disapproved and over-ruled.
We must not forget this fact, even-though at times the judges did not move as
fast as other people. These processes have kept the declared judicial rules within
hailing distance of advancing civilization, although occasionally civilization is
obliged to send out a loud hail."
Hon. John W. Davis, The Casefor the Case Lawyer (19z6) 3 MAss. L. Q. 99,
,02 (This interesting article is not sufficiently well known.): "To make precedents
the fount and origin of the law is to compel their study; to compel their study is to
put a premium upon the knowledge so acquired; and to put a premium upon this
knowledge is to encourage its over-exhibition by the overzealous. We should
think of the case lawyer at least with the charity due to one who has been led into
temptation."
Hon. Lindley M. Garrison, Blind Adherence to Precedents (1917) 51 Au. L.
REv. 251, 252: "If this system had resulted in an unbroken line of unanimous
decision, even though it might be admitted that error had crept in and that many
principles had been distorted, and some denied, there would be much to be said in
favour thereof, and great caution would be proper before attempting to alter the
system even for the purpose of reaching and curing those instances in which error
had intruded. But we all know that the system has not resulted in any such
thing. In all, except the simplest matters, there is a great contrariety of decision
and precedent."
Dean Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (1928) 28 COL. L.
REV. 1014, IO36: "This doctrine [stare decisis] has never been needed, it can be
obviated in any case, but it is sometimes embarrassing and frequently requires
subtlety in order to avoid its effects. It creates infinitely more difficulties than it
renders benefits. For one thing a court's scheme of things may become so ponderous in the course of time that the succeeding judges cannot possibly know
what their predecessors have done. Courts unwittingly reverse themselves more
often than otherwise, and doubtless they spend more time trying to maintain a
consistency of decision than on any other one problem. Moreover, this feeling
that a court must drag along the dead part of itself creates a psychological deadweight of tremendous import."
Robert Sprague Hall, Precedents and Courts (1917) 51 Am. L. Rzv. 833, 855:
"And when the court has been found to have taken a false position, it should not,
when the opportunity arrives for it to correct its mistake, sophisticate, in order to
avoid admitting its former error."
Thomas P. Hardman, op. cit. supranote 33, at 165-6: "The result is that within
the last few years there has been in many quarters a perceptible change of judicial
and juristic attitude toward the function of precedents-a tendency in the direction of conscious judicial renovation, judicial legislation or judicial restatement
of the law.... With respect to the function of applying such apt precedents or
precepts to the facts of the case, where the logical or historical application after
the manner of the last generation would defeat the social justice desired, there is
in many localities a growing tendency toward a less mechanical application, so as
to do justice in the individual case or in that class of cases."
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W. Pound and of Dean McMurray, and in Chief Judge Cardozo's
famous book, The Nature of the Judicial Process.
Frederick G. Mclean, Jr., The Rule of Precedents (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv.
481, 487, 488, 491,494, 496: "[Tlhus expediency no less than themoral force of the
principle stare decisis inclines courts to abide by precedent in such cases [rules of
property]. Of course changes affecting contingent interests and expectancies and
which do not disturb vested rights will be unhesitatingly corrected...
"Another wide class of cases in which courts hesitate to overrule precedents
arises where contracts have been made in reliance upon a decision....
"As no man has a vested right to do wrong, precedents per se have less weight
in the law of torts than in that of contracts and property....
"There is no vested right in erroneous precedents in criminal law....
"The maxim staredecisis, etc., does not appear to have very great weight in the
law of evidence and procedure, as a general rule."
Hon. Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37
HARV. L. REv. 409, 413: "For the purpose of keeping the law standardized so it
may be knowable to all, the doctrine of stare decisis dictates that decisions formally reduced to judgment shall thereafter be followed as precedents; that is to say,
the law of such decisions,-even though thought to be wrong in principle or to
have been incorrectly applied,-shall not be departed from in subsequent cases
where a departure is apt to do more harm than would occur should the decision
be allowed to stand until the legislature might see fit to change the rules of
conduct there laid down or acted upon. But if, after thorough examination and
deep thought, a prior judicial decision seems wrong in principle or manifestly
out of accord with modern conditions of life, it should not be followed as a controlling precedent, where departure therefrom can be made without unduly
affecting contract rights or other interests calling for consideration."
Dean Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (19o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 6o5,
614: "That our case law at its maturity has acquired the sterility of a fully developed system, may be shown by abundant examples of its failure to respond to
vital needs of present day life.... Our judge-made law is losing its vitality, and
it is a normal phenomenon that it should do so."
Dean Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action (191o) 44 Amg. L. Rav.
12, 2o: "We have developed so minute a jurisprudence of rules, we have interposed such a cloud of minute deductions between principles and concrete cases,
that our case-law has become ultra-mechanical, and is no longer an effective
instrument of justice if applied with technical accuracy."
Dean Roscoe Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV.
940, 943: ". . . If we actually set as much store by single decisions as we purport
to do in legal theory, the path of the law would lie in a labyrinth. In truth, our
practice has learned to make large allowances for both of these features of decision which are inseparable from a judge-made customary law. The tables
of cases distinguished and cases overruled tell a significant story."
Clarence G. Shenton, The Common Law System of JudicialPrecedent Compared
with Codificationas a System of Jurisprudence(19x8) 23 DicK. L. REv. 37, 50, 51:
......
The exceptions sanctioned by the sponsors and advocates of the rule have
consumed it. As a means of promoting stability and certainty stare decisis is a
wretched failure....
"Stare decisis requires us to assume the unbelievable, that all precedents have
been correctly decided for all time, or else to conclude that, in its futile attempts
to promote stability, its sole justification is to perpetuate error."
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Judge Pound says.
Case law is not wholly bound by the rules of past generations.
It is a "myth of the law" that stare decisis is impregnable or is
anything more than a salutary maxim to promote justice. Although "certainty is the very essence of the law," the law may
be changed by the courts by reversing or modifying a rule when
the rule has been demonstrated to be erroneous either through
failure of adequate presentation of proper consideration, or consideration out of due time of the earlier case, or when "through
changed conditions it has become obviously harmful or detrimental to society."
The American doctrine is stated by Dean McMurray as follows.
In such matters, we can only speak of averages, of tendencies.
And it is, I think, safe to say that in most American jurisdicHon. Harlan F. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification (1923)
COL. L. REV. 319, 320: "....A generation ago the suggestion that we should
seriously consider any substitute for the traditional method of developing and
systematizing our law by judicial decisions, corrected or supplemented by occasional, more or less haphazard legislation, would have been accorded the scant
courtesy of mildly derisive opposition. But what then seemed impossible or improbable has already been transferred into the realm of the probable and those
who appraise the tendencies which give substance and direction to our legal
development and who view the future with discerning eye already see the problem
of law simplification as one which is not only inevitable but immediate....
"... .But every new citator, every new digest, every new compilation which we
eagerly seize upon to lighten our labours, comes, like Banquo's ghost, to confront
us with the disquieting reality that the common law system of precedent which
our forbears have cherished for some ten centuries cannot continue indefinitely
to develop solely through the medium of reported decisions."
Edward B. Whitney, The Doctrineof Stare Decisis (1904) 3 MicH. L. REv. 89,94:
"Yet I believe not only that the doctrine of stare decisis, unless some entirely
novel and radical legislation can be devised to save it, must disappear through the
inevitable course of human progress-and progress does not always lead from a
worse to a better system-but that its hold, in the more crowded Federal and
State courts at least, has already to a considerable extent been weakened."
John E. Young, Law as an Expression of Ideals (1917) 27 YALE L. J. I, 29:
"The court's change of heart has not, however, proceeded far enough to remedy
all the evils peculiar to judicial legislation; for at the present time when a new
question arises, it is governed more in framing a rule to decide it by what Glanvil,
Bracton, Coke, or Blackstone may have said in respect to a somewhat similar
matter, than by a consideration of the results it will produce; that is, by a consideration of whether these results will probably be just as the ordinary man
understands justice; while it is too plain for argument that that is the test which
should be applied to determine whether a law is just, if laws are intended to
effectuate public ideals."
41Pound, Some Recent Phases of the Evolution of Case Law (1922) 31 YALE
L. J. 361, 363.
aMcMurray, Changing Conceptions of Law (1915) 3 CALIF. L. REv. 44I, 446.
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tions today a more rational theory as to the binding force of
precedent generally obtains than that held by the British House
of Lords. The very multiplication of authority tends to impair
to some extent its force, especially where the decisions in various
jurisdictions are inconsistent and conflicting. The better class
of modem lawyers and judges have, in part from the very copiousness of authority, come to regard precedent as their servant
and not as their master, as presumptive evidence of what the law
is rather than as absolutely conclusive evidence.
Chief Judge Cardozo says:4
I think adherence to precedent should be the rule and not
the exception ....
But I am ready to concede that the rule
of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned,
ought to be in some degree relaxed ....
There shouldbe greater
readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be
discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined
the conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin
it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained
a new significance or development with the progress of the years.
The more radical repudiation can be found in Dean Wigmore's
Problems of Law-"
Is the judge to be bound by his precedent? This part of the
question ought not to trouble us overmuch. Stare decisis, as
an absolute dogma, has seemed to me an unreal fetich. The
French Civil Code expressly repudiates it; and, though French
and other Continental judges do follow precedents to some extent, they do so presumably only to the extent that justice
requires it for safety's sake. Stare decisis is said to be indispensable for securing certainty in the application of the law. But
the sufficient answer is that it has not in fact secured it. Our
judicial law is as uncertain as any law could well be. We possess
all the detriment of uncertainty, which stare decisis was supposed to avoid, and also all the detriment of ancient lawlumber, which stare decisis concededly involves,-the government of the living by the dead, as Herbert Spencer has called it.
Professor Oliphant, in his Presidential Address to the Association
of American Law Schools in x927," 6 took an equally radical position
although he disguised it under the title of A Return to Stare Decisis.
His plea resembles Rousseau's demand for a return to the law of
nature-a law of nature which never existed except in the author's
imagination. The theory Professor Oliphant advances is really
that of the civil law, for it is the practice of the court which he considers to be the important matter:
Not the judges' opinions, but which way they decide cases
will be the dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific
4CARDozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)

"WIGMORE,

PROBLEMS OF LAW (1920)

79.

149, 150, 151.

4-(1928) 14

A. B. A. J. 71, 159.
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study of law. This is the field for scholarly work worthy of
best talents for the work to be done is not the study of vague
and shifting rationalizations but the study of such tough things
as the accumulated wisdom of men taught by immediate experiences in contemporary life,-the battered experiences of
judges among brutal facts.
It is, I think, therefore safe to say that the present American
tendency is strongly away from the strict English doctrine of stare
decisis. But is this merely a temporary step to be followed by the
reaction which so frequently succeeds legal innovations, or is it
likely to be accentuated in the future? I believe that the latter is
the fact, and that in no distant time the American doctrine will
approximate that of the civil law. This will be due in large part to
five reasons: (i) the uncontrollable flood of American decisions,
(2) the predominant position of constitutional questions in American
law, (3)the American need for flexibility in legal rules, (4)the method
of teaching in the American law schools, and (5) the restatement of
the law by the American Law Institute.
(i) It is not necessary to point out to a legal audience how unmanageable is the bulk of our American case law at the present time.
Every year we are publishing about three hundred and fifty volumes
of reports, which can be compared with the five or six volumes for
all of England and Wales. As far back as 19o2 the President of the
4
American Bar Association, in his annual address to the Association,
stated that the law reports of the past year contained 262,000 pages,
and estimated that a man by reading ioo pages a day might go
through them in eight years: by which time there would be new
reports on hand sufficient to occupy him for fifty-six years more.
Nothing effective has been done since then in the way of birth control
or infanticide to check "the fecundity of our case law" which "would
make Malthus stand aghast. 4 7 Mr. Justice Stone appeals to the
judges, 48 "Unless courts set some restraints on the length and number
of published opinions, it is inevitable that our present system of
making the law reports the chief repository of our unwritten law
will break down of its own weight." But is there any likelihood that
this appeal will be heard? 9
4
1Cited by Whitney, op. cit. supra note 4o ,at 97.
4
7CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 4: "The fecundity of our case
law would make Malthus stand aghast. Adherence to precedent was once a
steadying force, the guarantee, as it seemed, of stability -and certainty. We
would not sacrifice any of the brood, and now the spawning progeny, forgetful
of 48
our mercy, are rending those who spared them."
STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1915) 214.
491n his article, The Art of Judicial Reporting (1925) 10 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 1O3, Mr. Rosbrook, Deputy New York Supreme Court Reporter, gives some
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Inevitably as the number of opinions increases so does their
length, for there are more relevant authorities which must be cited.
Mr. John W. Davis 0 has referred to two extreme examples-one
opinion which contained 35, citations, and another which boasted
of 325. These are fortunately exceptional, but many conscientious
judges feel that it is necessary to refer to a large number of cases
to show that they have covered the law on the subject. Where the
question is one on which the courts of the various states are nearly
divided, the judge's opinion may resemble a table of cases. With this
can be compared the judgments of the English courts in which the
number of citations rarely exceeds five or six. As an example I
have chosen volume I of the 1926 King's Bench reports which
covers 53 cases. The total number of citations for 48 of these cases
is 201, or an average of 4 1/5 citations per case. The largest number
for any one case was 13, and in five there were no citations.
I have excluded five cases all decided by one erudite judge who is
so exceptional in his enthusiasm for citations that to include him
would give a false idea of the usual practice. He has 94 citations
in his five cases, the highest number in any one case being 27.
Much as we may pity the judge and the practicing lawyer who must
work under the American system, we must reserve the major part
of our sympathy for the legal author. In an attempt to give a true
exposition of even a comparatively simple legal question he may
have to digest literally hundreds of cases. Some American legal
articles have been described, not unfairly, as a line of text supported
by a page of footnotes. Is it surprising that the men who have been
crushed by this system have at last revolted and are demanding a
new method which will be concerned with legal principles instead
of with the minutiae of myriad precedents ?"'
interesting figures to show what has been done in the New York Court of Appeals
and in the United States Supreme Court to cut down the number of reported
opinions. The percentage of cases in which opinions were written was reduced in
both courts: in 19o6 the United States Supreme Court wrote opinions in 47 per
cent of the cases while in 1923 the percentage was reduced to 29; in 19o6 the
percentage for the New York Court of Appeals was 35 while in 1923 it was 28.6.
Owing, however, to the increase in litigation the actual number of opinions remained stationary. In 19o6 the United States Supreme Court wrote 187 opinions
and in 1923 it wrote 21x-an increase of 24; in 19o6 the New York Court of
Appeals wrote 201 opinions and in 1923 it wrote 192-a decrease of 9.
50
0p. cit. supranote 40, at 1o8.
51The only optimistic note is sounded by Mr. Justice Holmes in his article,
The Path of the Law (1897) IO HARv. L. REv. 457, 458: "The number of our pre-

dictions when generalized and reduced to a system is not unmanageably large.
They present themselves as a finite body of dogma which may be mastered within

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
(2)
A second reason for the American attitude to the doctrine
of precedent can be found in the predominant position of constitutional cases in American law. As these are, of course, of peculiar
interest and importance, it is only natural that the legal method
necessary for their solution should influence the method applied to
ordinary common law cases. But in dealing with constitutional
questions it has been found essential to keep the law as flexible as
possible. In the last analysis these questions are primarily questions
of public policy, and here the doctrine of stare decisis is least successful. Lord Watson has stated this in striking words in the leading
case of Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. :52

A series of decisions based upon grounds of public policy,
however eminent the judges by whom they were delivered,
cannot possess the same binding authority as decisions which
deal with and formulate principles which are purely legal. The
course of policy pursued by any country in relation to, and for
promoting the interests of, its commerce must, as time advances
and as its commerce thrives, undergo change and development
from various causes which are altogether independent of the
action of its Courts. In England, at least, it is beyond the jurisdiction of her tribunals to mould and stereotype national policy.
The English courts, which deal almost solely with questions of strict
law, do not feel cramped by the doctrine of stare decisis; the American
courts sometimes find it necessary on questions of constitutional
law to make a complete volte face within the course of a few years. 3
It is natural, therefore, that, when these same courts are faced with
questions of private law, they should adopt a similar view in regard
to the binding nature of common law precedents.
(3)But even if the method in use in constitutional cases had not
influenced the method to be applied in private law, nevertheless
the strict English doctrine would have proved unsuitable to American life. The rapidly changing social and economic conditions in the
United States place the rigidity of the case system under an unusual
a reasonable time. It is a great mistake to be frightened by the ever increasing
number of reports. The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the
present point of view. We could reconstruct the corpus from them if all that
went before were burned. The use of the earlier reports is mainly historical, a use
about which I shall have something to say before I have finished."
But reports which can be mastered within a reasonable time by such a legal
genius as Mr. Justice Holmes may prove unmanageable for the ordinary lawyer.
52[18941 A. C. 535, 553. Cf. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common
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(1928) 42 HARv. L. REV.76.

5Cf. People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 8I N. E. 778 (1907) with People v.
Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, IO8 N. E.639 (1915).
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and heavy strain. At one time it was the fashion to suggest that
the primary virtue of the case system was its flexibility, and that
because of this the common law was able to adapt itself to changing
conditions while the civil law had to remain stationary, but as
Professor Geldart has pointed out, this is the exact reverse of the
truth.54 "Where a rule has once been decided, even though wrongly,
it is difficult or impossible to depart from it. I do not agree with those
who think that flexibility is a characteristic of Case Law. The binding force of precedent is a fetter on the discretion of the judge;
but for precedent he would have a much freer hand."55 The case
system, therefore, satisfies the needs of a country such as England
where conditions are more or less static; its conservatism is less
suited to the United States with its kaleidoscopic civilization.
(4)A less obvious, but an equally powerful, influence in undermining the strict doctrine of precedent has been the method of
teaching in the American law schools, not only in those which are
departing from the absolute casebook method but also in those
which are still true to it. Is not the case book method the apotheosis
of precedent? Is it not based on the theory that the law is only
to be found in the ratio decidendi of the cases? Is it not merely a
modem adaptation of the medieval moots, those cradles of the common law? Superficially the method is the same, but the result is
essentially different because the materials used are different. The
medieval moots dealt with English law. But the American law school
does not teach American law, for there is no such law. "The national law school," Judge Pound has said,5" "teaches 'general legal
principles' which are assumed to be uniform, although state rules
vary." . The method is primarily the method of comparative law,
in which the doctrines laid down in English, federal, Massachusetts,
Ohio, and New York cases are analysed and compared. As in dealing with so many jurisdictions it is almost always possible, especially
where the point at issue is a doubtful one, to find cases which reach
54GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW, 28.

nFor the contrary view see Win. Draper Lewis, Present Status of the American
Law Institute (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. RFv. 337, in which he says: "The common
law system has one great advantage over the system of expressing and developing
law by the action of legislatures. This advantage is its flexibility. No principle
of the common law is so firmly established as to prevent its modification in
application by a court if the facts of the instant case show the injustice of its unmodified application. The common law is thus capable of being molded to the
changing needs of life silently and without the shock of sudden change which so
often results from legislative changes."
5Pound, The Law School Curriculum (1923) 8 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 117,

125.
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conflicting results 6n the same state of facts, the task of the student
is to weigh their comparative claims to validity. This may depend
upon a large number of different factors, including in many cases a
consideration of the practical effect of the result. The teacher must
guide the student in his choice between the conflicting cases, and,
in doing so, he tends to lay down a general principle himself by which
to test the cases. He is, therefore, less concerned with the ratio
decidendi given by the court in each particular case than with the
general average of the results reached by the courts of the various
states. The constantly recurring expression, "the majority and the
minority rule", is evidence of this comparative law method. An
English teacher of law, on the other hand, has a far simpler task,
for it is only necessary for him to determine what principles and
rules the courts of a single jurisdiction will follow. He is primarily
an expositor; he analyses the grounds on which the judges have
decided a particular case and suggests how far the principle necessarily involved therein may extend. Rarely will he refer to the cases
of another jurisdiction, unless the point is one which has not been
settled by English law. The English teacher emphasizes what the
judge has said: the American professor explains what the judge
should have said.
The distinction between the American and the English method
of instruction is even more clearly marked in the moot courts. For
example, a Harvard moot court is a court sitting in an imaginary
jurisdiction of Ames. 7 As all precedents are merely persuasive, the
arguments are concerned with the determination of what principle
it would be best for the court to adopt. A moot court in the Inns of
Court or at Cambridge University, on the other hand, is sitting as
an English court. It is bound by English precedents, and it must
follow the principles laid down in these whether it believes them to
be correct or not.
The American law student, having been taught not the law of a
single jurisdiction but the principles of a number of different jurisdictions, is less inclined to believe in the authority of precedents
than is his English brother. His critical faculty has been sharpened
to such an extent that he regards every judicial opinion with suspicion. With such a background, his devotion to the doctrine of
stare decisis must be far weaker than is that of the English student
57
lntrodiuctory Suggestionsfor Law School Work, Harvard University (1928-29),
at 33: "Of course, in law.club arguments all decisions are 'persuasive authority
only'. There is deemed to be no law as yet in the 'Ames Jurisdiction' on the particular point or points involved in counsel's case."
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who has been taught to accept the doctrine contained in a case as
laying down the law. It is only natural that in later life, when the
student has become a practicing lawyer or a judge, he will be profoundly influenced by his early training.
(5)Finally, the tendency to depart from the doctrine of stare
decisis will receive a tremendous impetus in the restatements of the
American Law Institute. As long as there was nothing to put in
its place, the precedent system, or some slightly modified form of
that system, was bound to continue unless we were to have more or
less arbitrary justice. If the judges were not bound by prior cases,
what limits would there be to judicial legislation? But with the
creation of a code of law, whether official or unofficial, an adequate
substitute can be offered. Its acceptance may be delayed for a
number of years, but it is almost inevitable that it will in time replace
the clumsy machinery of today. 8
These are some of the more important influences which are undermining the doctrine of precedent in the United States at the present
time. But it is doubtful whether the system of case law has ever
been really suited to the conditions peculiar to this country. In
speaking of the history of case law in his recent book, Some Lessons
from Our Legal History, Professor Holdsworth says."
A system of case law will never be so successful as it has been
in England, in the absence of the peculiar conditions in which
it originated and was developed. These conditions can, I think,
be summarized as follows:
In the first place, a system of case law demands, for its satisfactory working, the presence of a centralized judicial system....
In the second place, a system of case law demands a group of
learned lawyers, both at the Bar and on the Bench, who are
bound together by a common professional tradition...
In the third place, a system of case law demands an independent well paid bench, which is, on the whole, more able than
the bar.
58

The success of the American Law Institute's work will depend upon the
degree to which past cases are no longer cited as precedents. The restatements
are not intended to be well-made digests of past cases; they are a substitute for
these cases. In The American Law Institute (1927) 43 L. Q. REv. 449, 458, 459,
Mr. George W. Wickersham, President of the Institute, said: "The restatements
are designed not merely to furnish clear and accurate statements of the rules
of the common law, but where a divergence of opinion has arisen upon the rule
in any given case, to influence the highest Courts of the different States to adopt
that rule which on the whole seems to be sustained by the soundest reason...
"A mere academic restatement of the law, whatever its form, will not be
sufficient for the undertaking. To fulfil its objects the restatement must have an
authority greater than that now accorded to any legal treatise, an authority
more nearly on a par with that accorded the decisions of the Courts."
59

HoLDswoRTH, SOME LESSONS FROM OUR LEGAL HiSTORY, 20, 22, 23.
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No one of these three conditions can be found in the United States
at the present day. In place of a small judiciary centralized in
London,60 there is an army of judges scattered throughout the states
in a bewildering number of courts. For each English judge there
must be at least a hundred American ones. Mr. Justice Stone has
given some interesting figures :1 "In New York we have 1o9 Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals judges, or approximately one judge
to each ioo,ooo inhabitants...

In England and Scotland there are

judges exercising powers corresponding to those of our Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals judges numbering 49, or approximately
one judge for each 840,000 of the population." These figures are
even more striking if we include the federal district and circuit
judges. It is obvious that, if the law as between the various states,
or even within a single state, is to develop any uniformity, it cannot
be left to depend upon the diverse interpretations of a thousand
'different judges.
The case system also requires a learned bar on which the bench
can rely. Judicial work becomes overwhelming if the judge must
depend on his own research for the relevant authorities. In England,
with a practicing bar limited to a few hundred barristers of ability
and experience, the courts are free to assume that their sole duty is
to determine the issue on the arguments advanced by counsel.6 2
One result of this reliance is that in the majority of the cases the
judges are able to deliver oral judgments immediately upon the
conclusion of the argument. In America there are as many able
lawyers as there are in England, but there is also a far larger number
of less competent ones. Unfortunately,' it is of frequent occurrence
that the cases which are of the greatest importance to law as a
science are argued by lawyers of the second class.6 In deciding the
cases the courts too often must rely upon themselves.
60

London has remained the centre of the English judicial system. Such great
cities as Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester do not have permanent High
Court judges, but are only visited from time to time by judges on circuit from
London.
61
SToNE, op. cit. supra note 48, at 210.
62
1n Glebe Sugar Refining Co. v. Trustees of Greenock, [1921 ] W. N. 85, 86,
the Lord Chancellor said: It is not possible in the ordinary course for their Lordships to be aware of all the authorities, statutory and otherwise, which might be
relevant to the issues in the particular case. Their lordships are in the hands
of counsel and those that instruct counsel, and it is the practice of the House to
expect, and even to insist, that authorities that bear one way or another upon
matters in debate, shall be brought by counsel to their attention.
"Cf. Judge Learned Hand, Bench, Bar and Law Teaching (1926) 24 MIcH.
L. REv. 466, 478: "Indeed, in my own city the best minds of the profession are
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For the system to justify itself it is obvious that there must be
respect for the wisdom and learning of the judge. To ask a court
to follow the judgments of Lord Coke or Lord Holt is one thing;
to expect it to be bound by the views of Scroggs or Jeffreys is quite
another. Under the latter circumstances the doctrine of precedent
becomes unreasonable. In view of the great number of American
judges, and the unfortunate method of choice in some of the states,
there must be some judges whose decisions will be accepted with a
certain hesitancy." But here the rule applied to Sodom and Gomorrah must be reversed, for one weak judge will do more to discredit the doctrine of case law than ten able ones can remedy. It
is only if the great majority of the decisions meet with the approval
of the legal profession that the belief in the authority of precedents
can continue.
Thus the conditions peculiar to England, which have made
case law so successful there, do not exist in the United States. We
can, therefore, face the prospect of an eclipse of the doctrine of
stare decisis without regret. But whether we regret it or not, I
believe that such a change is inevitable. Precedents, and especially
the precedent of a single case, will no longer be considered a binding
source of law which judges must accept under all circumstances.
Only if decided cases have created a practice upon which laymen
have relied, will the American courts feel that they are bound to
follow them. This, as I have attempted to show, is the doctrine
of the civil law and directly contrary to that of the English law with
its insistence upon the need for certainty. I therefore believe that,
as concerns the fundamental doctrine of precedent, English and
American law are at the parting of their ways. 5
scarcely lawyers at all. They may be something much better or much worse,
but they are not that. With courts they have no dealings whatever, and would
hardly know what to do in one if they came there. For example, the situation
has become such that I cannot quite see how a system of jurisprudence dependent
upon precedent is permanently to get on at all with its best talent steadily drawn
away from the precedent makers."
6Cf. CARDOZO, op. cit. supranote 47, at 5: "The output of a multitude of minds
must be expected to contain its proportion of vagaries. So vast a brood includes
the defective and the helpless."
6uThis address consists almost entirely of quotations from other writers, but,
if I may be permitted one more quotation, "The convincing force, if any such
there be, of this article will consist in its want of originality." Judge Jeremiah
Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence(1895) 9 HARv. L. REv.13, 14.

